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Abstract. LWE-based cryptosystems are an attractive alternative to
traditional ones in the post-quantum era. To minimize the storage cost
of part of its public key - a 256×640 integer matrix, T - a binary version
of T has been proposed. One component of its ciphertext, c1 is computed
as c1 = Tu where u is an ephemeral secret. Knowing u, the plaintext can
be deduced. Given c1 and T, Galbraith’s challenge is to compute u with
existing computing resources in 1 year. Our hybrid approach guesses
and removes some bits of the solution vector and maps the problem
of solving the resulting sub-instance to the Closest Vector Problem in
Lattice Theory. The lattice-based approach reduces the number of bits
to be guessed while the initial guess based on LP relaxation reduces the
number of subsequent guesses to polynomial rather than exponential in
the number of guessed bits. Further enhancements partition the set of
guessed bits and use a 2-step application of LP. Given the constraint
of processor cores and time, a one-time training algorithm learns the
optimal combination of partitions yielding a success rate of 9% - 23%
with 1000 - 100,000 cores in 1 year. This compares favourably with earlier
work that yielded 2% success with 3000 cores.
Keywords: Learning With Errors, Closest Vector Problem, Galbraith’s
binary LWE, Linear Programming, Integer Linear Programming
1 Introduction
Introduced by Regev [11] in 2005, Learning with Errors (LWE) is a problem in
machine learning and is as hard to solve as certain worst-case lattice problems.
Unlike most widely used cryptographic algorithms, it is known to be invulnera-
ble to quantum computers. It is the basis of many cryptographic constructions
including IND-CPA and IND-CCA secure encryption [11] [19], homomorphic en-
cryption [21] [22], identity-based encryption [15] [16], oblivious transfer protocols
[17], lossy-trapdoor functions [18] and many more.
The LWE cryptosystem performs bit by bit encryption. The private key, s,
is a vector of length n where each element of s is randomly chosen over Zq, q
prime. The corresponding public key has two components. The first is a random
m× n matrix, T , with elements over Zq and with rows denoted ai. The second
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component is a vector, b, of length m where the ith element of b is sTai + ei
(mod q). The ei’s are drawn from a discretized normal distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation σ.
To encrypt a bit, x, a random binary vector (nonce), u, of length m is chosen.
This is a per-message ephemeral secret. The ciphertext is (c1, c2) where c1 = Tu
(mod q) and c2 = bu+xbq/2c (mod q). A received message is decrypted to 0 or
1 depending on whether c2 − c1s is closer to 0 or bq/2c.
To thwart various lattice-based attacks, Lindner et al. [20] suggested the
values of 256, 640 and 4093 respectively for n, m and q leading to a public key
of size 640(256 + 1)log2(4093) = 246.7 Kbytes. However, this is far higher than
the size of the RSA or ECC public keys which are less than 1 Kbyte.
To reduce the key size of original LWE problem, [1] proposed that the matrix
T and secret vector s be binary. In addition, possible attacks on the nonce to
recover the plaintext were discussed. Galbraith posed two challenges, the first
challenge is to compute u given a random 256× 400 binary matrix T and c1 =
Tu in one day using an ordinary PC. The second challenge is to compute u with
matrix T dimension 256× 640 in one year using “current computing facilities”.
The aim of this work is to address Galbraith’s second challenge with a much
higher success rate than what was previously achieved [2],[5]. Ours is a hybrid
approach using, both, Linear Programming (LP) and a lattice-based one.
In our approach, LP is initially applied on the given instance. Based on the LP
output, an initial guess of p bits of the secret is made. A sub-instance is created
after removing the p guessed bits. By using a lattice-based approach (rather
than Integer Linear Programming (ILP) [5]) to solve the reduced instance, we
require 20% fewer bits of the solution vector to be guessed and removed. This
results in a 300% saving in computation time. The problem of obtaining the
remaining bits of the secret is mapped to the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) in
lattice theory. If the initial guess is unsuccessful, a fresh guess is made and the
process is repeated until we run out of compute power or time. The substantial
decrease in execution time is due to, both, a fewer number of bits to be guessed
and, further, a considerable reduction in the expected number of guesses from
exponential to polynomial in p due to the application of LP.
The second enhancement involves a two-step application of LP. After its first
application, p bits are guessed and removed. LP is again applied on the reduced
sub-instance after which 230 − p bits are guessed and removed. The lattice-
based approach is then employed on the doubly reduced sub-instance. The key
advantage of of the two-step approach is that the expected number of errors in
the 230−p guessed bits is reduced compared to the case with a single application
of LP. This translates to a substantial reduction in the number of guesses (and
hence execution time).
For a given p and the initial guesses of the p and 230 − p bits (based on
the LP output), we hypothesize that there are respectively e1 and e2 errors
in those bits. Different hypotheses are defined by varying the values of p, e1,
and e2. Our strategy is to learn which hypotheses are satisfied by the largest
number of the instances while simultaneously factoring the computation time
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to process the guesses (the number of guess is a function of p, e1, e2). In the
training phase, we use a variant of the Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem
to iteratively select the best set of hypotheses subject to optimizing an objective
function that incorporates the number of new instances added and the execution
time. By combining multiple hypotheses, we obtain a substantial improvement
in success rate or equivalently a considerable reduction in execution time for a
given success rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background material.
Our contributions are presented as three strategies - the first two are presented
in Section 3 and the third is in Section 4. Section 5 is a brief summary of related
work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Table 1.1: Notations
Symbol Meaning
us LP output vector after sorting and round-off
u
′
s Sorted, rounded-off 640− p bit vector after applying LP twice
us1 ,us2 ,us3 First 230, next 256 and last 154 bits of solution vector us
p Number of bits removed after first application of LP
e1 Number of errors in p bits.
e2 Number of errors in next 230− p bits.
tLP Computing time of Linear Programing (LP)
tLR Computing time of Lattice Reduction (LR)
tB Computing time of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm
s(p, e1, e2) Instances with e1 errors in first p bits and e2 errors in 230− p bits.
t(p, e1, e2) Total time to compute Algorithm 1 with input parameters p, e1, e2
2 Background
A Lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. Equivalently, L is comprised
of integer linear combinations of a set of linearly independent vectors. A lat-
tice is represented by a basis, a set of m linearly independent integer vectors
(b1, b2, · · · , bm) each of size n which generates the lattice
L(b1, b2, · · · , bm) =
{ m∑
i=0
xibi : xi ∈ Z
}
A lattice can have multiple bases and a basis is usually represented by m × n
matrix where m basis vectors are rows of the matrix.
One of the hard problems in lattice based cryptography is the Closest Vector
Problem (CVP). The problem is to find a lattice vector u given a basis B of
some lattice L = L(B) and a non-lattice vector v ∈ Rn with minimum ||u− v||.
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One of the best known solutions to solving CVP is the Nearest Plane algorithm
developed by Babai[7].
Before applying Babai’s Algorithm, lattice reduction is performed to obtain
short and near-orthogonal basis vectors. Some of the different lattice reduction
algorithms are LLL, BKZ and BKZ2.0. BKZ [12] algorithms behave differently
based on block size k. In practice, run time of BKZ increases rapidly with block
size and becomes practically infeasible for k > 30 or so. Chen and Nguyen [8]
presented an updated version of BKZ i.e. BKZ 2.0. It uses extreme pruning
techniques of Gama-Nguyen-Regev [13] that significantly decreases the running
time of enumeration subroutine without degrading its output quality allowing
much higher block size (β ≥ 40) in high dimension.
Implementations of LLL, BKZ and BKZ 2.0 are available in many software
packages, notably in NTL[6], FLINT[9] and fplll[10]. In our implementation, we
have used BKZ 2.0 from fplll library with block size k = 22.
For pre-processing and guessing some bits of the ephemeral secret, u we use
Linear Programming (LP). LP is used to determine the best possible solution
from a given list of requirements represented in the form of linear relationships.
The standard algorithm for solving LP is the Simplex Algorithm though it
is not guaranteed to run in polynomial time. Later, it was shown that LP could
be done in polynomial time by using the Ellipsoid Algorithm (but it tends to
be fairly slow in practice). Karmarkar proposed a much faster polynomial-time
algorithm - the first of a class of so-called interior-point methods.
In our implementation, we have used Matlab’s inbuilt linear programming
function, linprog. There are three variants of linear programming algorithms
available in Matlab viz dual-simplex, interior-point (default) and interior-point-
legacy. Often, the dual-simplex and interior-point algorithms are fast and use
least memory. The interior-point-legacy method is similar to the interior-point
algorithm but uses more memory and is slower and less robust. We have used
the default algorithm provided by Matlab to obtain the initial guess of u.
3 Our Approach
We introduce Strategy 1 which involves a lattice-based approach in conjunction
with LP. Strategy 2 which involves a 2-step application of LP is introduced next.
We begin by reviewing Strategy 0 which uses ILP.
3.1 Strategies 0, 1 and 2
As stated earlier, we attempt to obtain u given T and c1 in the equation below
Tu = c1 (1)
Our approach is summarized in Flowchart 3.1. The pre-processing step cre-
ates an approximate solution to Equation 1. We then guess selected bits in u
(Step 1) and create a reduced sub-instance (Step 2) by removing the guessed
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bits in u, deleting the corresponding columns of matrix T and re-computing the
value of c1. Formally, if the values of the guessed bits are u
(i1), u(i2), . . . , u(ir) in
positions i1, i2, . . . , ir, then those bits are removed from u, the i
th
1 , i
th
2 , . . . , i
th
r
columns in T are removed and new value of c1 is computed as
c
′
1 = c1 −
∑
i=i1,i2,...,ir
u(i)T (i) (2)
We then solve the resulting sub-instance and verify (Step 3) whether the
computed solution is binary and satisfies Equation 1. If not, we proceed with
the remaining guesses until the secret is obtained or we run out of guesses or
resources. While the approach is straightforward, several issues need to be ad-
dressed in its implementation.
1. Which bits of u may be guessed and what are the values of the guessed bits?
2. What method/technique should be used to solve the sub-instance (Step 2)?
3. If all the guessed bits are correctly guessed, then will the desired solution be
obtained?
We next outline several implementation strategies - Strategy 0 was adopted
in [5] while strategies 1-3 are newly introduced here.
Strategy 0: The LP formulation below from [2] is employed to solve Equa-
tion 1 (Step 0).
Optimization function: F (u) = 0
Constraints: Tu = c1, 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
For the size of matrix T under consideration, the elements of the solution
vector are fractions between 0 and 1. These are sorted in order of increasing
proximity to 0.5 and then rounded to 0 or 1. Let us denote the resulting vector
and let Ts be the matrix obtained by re-arranging columns of T in the same
order in which the bits of u are re-arranged to obtain us so that
Tsus = c1 (3)
Extensive experiments conducted in [5] indicate that the bits in us differ from
the corresponding bits in u in roughly 20% of the positions. Moreover, the prob-
ability that a bit in us is in error increases with its position (from left to right).
To corroborate those findings, we generated 10,000 random instances and per-
formed LP on each. We found that the average error probability in the first 100
bits is 0.02 while it is 0.44 for the last 100 bits.
[5] report that if all errors in the first 280 bits of us were corrected, then
the sub-instance created after removing these bits could be solved using Integer
Linear Programming (ILP) with almost 100% success rate. The first 280 bits in
us is our initial guess. Subsequent guesses are obtained by flipping different com-
binations of at most e of those 280 bits. Thus, there are
∑e
i=0
(
280
i
)
guesses to
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Pre-process the given instance
Guesses
exhausted ?
1) Make next guess of some
bits of solution vector
2) Create and solve sub-instance
3) Verify solution
Is solution
correct ?
Success Failure
Yes
Yes
No
Flowchart 3.1: Flowchart expounding the approach in Strategies 0 and 1
be made. For each guess, we create a reduced sub-instance and solve it using ILP.
In our experiments, we found that less than 12% of the instances have 11
or fewer errors in the first 280 bits of us. The number of guesses for the partial
secret is hence
∑11
i=0
(
280
i
) ∼ 1.8×1019. Processing a guess involves an ILP com-
putation. The computation time for ILP is input-dependent. [5] placed a limit
of 30 seconds on an ILP instance. Hence, the total time to process all guesses is
about a billion years using 3000 cores for a success rate of 12%. We next outline
a strategy wherein it suffices to guess only 230 bits rather than 280 bits.
Strategy 1: As in Strategy 0, we compute us and create a smaller sub-
instance by removing 230 bits in us. Unlike Strategy 0, we use a lattice-based
approach to solve the resulting sub-instance. Based on extensive experiments
with 10,000 instances, we found that it suffices to remove only the first 230 bits
from us to guarantee a solution for the sub-instance with probability ∼ 1.
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For a given guess of the first 230 bits of us, the remaining bits of the secret
are computed as follows. Let (Ts1,Ts2,Ts3) be a partitioning of Ts. Here Ts1,
Ts2 and Ts3 are 256 × 230, 256 × 256 and 256 × 154 sub-matrices. Let us =
(us1,us2,us3) be the corresponding partitioning of us into sub-vectors of length
230, 256 and 154 respectively. Using Equation 3, we have
Ts1us1 +Ts2us2 +Ts3us3 = c1 (4)
Re-arranging and pre-multiplying by T−1s2 ,
T−1s2 Ts3us3 ≡ −us2 +T−1s2 (c1 −Ts1us1) modα (5)
T−1s2 will, in general, have fractional values. So, we compute T
−1
s2 and all terms of
Equation 5 modulo a large prime, α 1. us2 is a binary vector and is of negligible
norm compared to T−1s2 (c1 −Ts1us1). So
(T−1s2 Ts3)us3 ≈ T−1s2 (c1 −Ts1us1) (6)
The LHS of Equation 6 is a vector in the lattice with basis T−1s2 Ts3 while
the RHS is a non-lattice vector. Hence the problem of computing us3 maps to
the classical Closest Vector Problem (CVP) in the theory of lattices.
Assuming e of the first 230 bits of us are in error, the time to discover the
secret is
tLP + tLR +
e∑
i=0
(
p
i
)
tB (7)
1 We experimented with different sizes and values of α. The selected value of bit size
is a trade-off between success probability and lattice reduction time. 26-bit primes
yielded a success rate of 99%.
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Strategy 2: As in Strategy 1, we guess 230 bits of the solution vector but
we do so in two steps. Algorithm 1 summarizes the procedure.
Algorithm 1: Hybrid Lattice Approach
Input: T256×640, c256×1, p, e1 and e2
Output: u (with significant probability Tu = c1)
1 function:ourLP(X, z)
2 Create an LP instance for Xy = z
3 Use the LP solver to obtain y
4 Sort y, round it and call it ys
5 // Sorting is in order of increasing proximity to 0.5
6 Arrange columns of X in the same order in which elements of y are
arranged to obtain ys and call it Xs.
7 return(Xs,ys)
8 (Ts,us) = ourLP(T, c1)
// Let Ts2 and Ts3 respectively denote columns 231− 486 and
487− 640 of Ts.
9 Compute T−1s2 mod α and perform lattice reduction on T
−1
s2 Ts3
10 v1 =first p bits of us
11 for each vector v
′
1 such that
∥∥∥v′1 − v1∥∥∥
1
≤ e1 do
12 c
′
= c1 −
∑p
i=1 v
′(i)
1 T
(i)
s
13 T
′
256×(640−p) consists of last (640− p) columns of Ts
14 (T
′
s,u
′
s) = ourLP(T
′, c′)
15 v2 = First (230− p) bits of u′s
16 for each vector v
′
2 such that
∥∥∥v′2 − v2∥∥∥
1
≤ e2 do
17 Substitute v
′
1 and v
′
2 for us1 in Equation 6
18 Solve CVP using Babai’s Algorithm
19 if correct solution is obtained then
20 Output v
′
1,v
′
2
21 Output -1
The function, ourLP is invoked to create a sorted, rounded-off solution
vector, us as in Strategy 1. The first p bits of us is the initial guess of these
bits. In each iteration of the outer loop, a fresh guess is made by flipping some
combination of e1 or fewer of those p bits. The p bits are removed and a sub-
instance of size 640 − p is created. ourLP is invoked to obtain u′s, a partial
solution vector of size 640− p. Each iteration of the inner loop involves guessing
the first 230 − p bits of u′s by flipping a different combination of e2 bits. Thus,
a total of p+ (230− p)= 230 bits are guessed to obtain us1 in Equation 6
A CVP instance is created and solved to obtain us3. This procedure continues
until it runs out of guesses or resources. Based on the above description of
Algorithm 1, it is clear that LP and Lattice Reduction (LR) are applied once
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per iteration of the outer loop while Babai’s algorithm is executed once per
iteration of the inner loop. The total time to run Algorithm 1 is thus
t(p, e1, e2) = tLP +
e1∑
i=0
(
p
i
)[
tLP + tLR +
e2∑
j=0
(
230− p
j
)
× tB
]
(8)
.
The notations and values of the execution times for the various operations
are listed in Table 3.1. The times were measured on Intel i5 Gen 4, with 3.5
GHz clock and 8 GB DRAM running Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit LTS. The LP solver
of Matlab 2015b was used. BKZ with block size=22 implemented in Sage and
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm were used.
Table 3.1: Time taken by different algorithm’s
Algorithm Implemented In Time (seconds)
Linear Programming Matlab tLP = 0.5
Int. Linear Programming Matlab 30 (bound)
Babai’s NP Algo. Sage tB = 8
BKZ with β = 22 Sage tLR = 10500
3.2 Results
To estimate success probability, we created a training set of n = 10, 000 randomly
generated instances. LP was applied on each instance, the LP output was sorted
and rounded. The first p bits of the resulting solution vector (us) were compared
with the corresponding bits of the actual secret to determine e1, the number of
bits in error. The p bits of us were corrected and removed to create a sub-instance
over which LP was again applied. The reduced solution vector was sorted and
rounded to obtain u
′
s. The first 230 − p bits of u
′
s were compared with the
corresponding bits of the true secret to determine the number of bits in error,
e2. The instance was then added to the “instance set”, s(p, e1, e2) - this is the
set of instances with e1 errors in the first p bits of us and e2 errors in the first
230 − p bits of u′s. This was carried out for all n = 10,000 instances. |s(p,e1,e2)|n
is a reasonable estimate of the success probability of running Algorithm 1 with
input parameters p, e1 and e2.
The computation times and success probabilities were computed for varying
e1 and e2 and for p ranging from 0 to 230 in steps of 5. The total computation
time assumes the values in Table 3.1 and the availability of 3000 cores. The value
of p which maximizes success probability is shown in Table 3.2. For a fixed value
of e1 + e2, this value of p increases with e1.
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(a) Components of Execution Time for (e1, e2) = (3, 2)
(b) Comparison of e1 + e2 = 5 (e1 = 3, e2 = 2) and e1 + e2 = 6 (e1 = 4, e2 = 2)
Fig. 3.1: Success Probability and Computation Time as a function of p
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Table 3.2: Value of p which maximizes success probability for given (e1, e2) pair
with 3000 cores
e1, e2 p Success Probability Time (days)
0, 5 0 5% 162
1, 4 75 4% 56
2, 3 150 4.7% 30
3, 2 175 6.1% 80
4, 1 195 6.4% 2,551
0, 6 0 9.4% 6,105
1, 5 75 7.7% 1,694
2, 4 130 8.2% 1,075
3, 3 160 10.6% 1,234
4, 2 175 11.8% 3,448
5, 1 195 12.4% 97,999
The maximum value of success probability increases with e1 (beyond e1=0).
This is at the cost of sharply escalating computation times (beyond e1=1). The
superiority of Strategy 2 over Strategy 1 is also on display - e1=0 corresponds
to Strategy 1. Note that Strategy 2 provides a higher success rate of 6.1% (for
p = 175, e1 = 3, e2 = 2 ) versus 5% (Strategy 1). Moreover the computation time
of the former is only 80 days compared to 162 days for the latter.
Fig. 3.2: Distribution of errors before and after second application of LP
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The variation of the execution time of Algorithm 1 denoted t(p, e1, e2) with p,
e1 and e2 can be better understood by examining the contribution of its various
components. The computation time is dominated by the execution of the Babai’s
Algorithm and Lattice Reduction (LR) (to a first-order approximation the time
for Linear Programming may be ignored).
LR is executed
∑e1
i=0
(
p
i
)
times while Babai’s Algorithm is executed
∑e1
i=0
(
p
i
)×∑e2
j=0
(
230−p
j
)
times. As shown in Figure 3.1a, the contribution of the latter to
t(p, 3, 2) peaks at p ≈ 140 while that of the former increases with p. Overall,
t(p, 3, 2) increases monotonically. For e1 > 3, LR dominates while for e1 < 3,
Babai’s algorithm dominates the computation time.
With Strategy 1, only a single execution of the compute-intensive LR op-
eration is performed. However, the number of executions of Babai’s algorithm,∑e
i=0
(
230
i
)
is significantly higher than that with Strategy 2. For example, to
achieve success probabilities of 5% and 6% with Strategies 1 and 2, the number
of executions of Babai’s algorithm are respectively 5.2 × 109 and 1.4 × 109 re-
sulting in an execution time of 162 and 42.5 days with 3000 cores respectively.
Thus, even though the time spent executing LR with Strategy 2 is 37.2 days,
the overall time of Strategy 2 is less than 50% that of Strategy 1.
The difference in the number of executions of Babai’s algorithm in Strategies
1 and 2 is partially explained by examining the distribution of errors in the
first 230 − p bits of u′s before and after the second application of LP. The two
distributions (Figure 3.2) have a similar shape but the latter is shifted left.
Hence,the second application of LP reduces the errors which in turn necessitates
fewer guesses and iterations of the inner loop of Algorithm 1.
Solving instances with 6 errors in the first 230 bits (e1 + e2 = 6) greatly
increases the success probability but at the expense of vastly higher execution
time (Figure 3.1b). The latter is because the number of guesses (and hence
execution time) is exponential in the number of errors. Once again, Strategy
2 yields a much higher success rate (11.8% versus 9.4%) with only 60% of the
execution time required by Strategy 1 (Table 3.2). The maximum success rate is
12.4% but at the cost of 3000 cores running continuously for about 300 years! In
the next section, we unveil a strategy which achieves much higher success rate
but executes in only 1 year.
4 Strategy 3
Strategy 2 attempted to run Algorithm 1 with the best possible parameter values
(p, e1 and e2) determined from experiments on a training set of 10,000 instances.
The highest success probability obtained was 6.1% with 3000 cores in a year.
Our next strategy (Strategy 3) is to greatly improve on this success rate
by running Algorithm 1 repeatedly with different parameter values subject to
resource constraints. To illustrate this idea, consider the three parameter sets
in Table 4.1. If Algorithm 1 is run in isolation with each of the parameter sets
shown, the success rates are 3.9%, 4.2% and 5.9% with 3000 cores in 52, 50
and 80 days respectively. However if Algorithm 1 is run twice with the first two
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parameter sets, a total of |s(80, 1, 4) ∪ s(120, 2, 3)| = 616 instances are likely to
succeed.
Table 4.1: Performance of Algorithm 1 with single and multiple parameter sets
(p, e1, e2) | S(p, e1, e2) | t(p, e1, e2)
(80,1,4) 391 52
(120,2,3) 422 50
(170,3,2) 593 80
Union 900 182
(80,1,4)
284(170,3,2)
120
(120,2,3)123
74
102
64
133
Fig. 4.1: Union of different instance sets appearing in Table 4.1
If Algorithm 1 is run a third time with the parameter set (170, 3, 2), the
overall success rate increases to 9%. This is achieved with 3000 cores running
continuously for about 6 months. The increases in success rates are best visual-
ized with the Venn diagram in Figure 4.1.
To maximize success probability, it is necessary to identify the parameter sets
with which Algorithm 1 should be run so that the union of the corresponding
instance sets is maximized while constraining the total execution time to 1 year.
However, this is not straightforward given that total number of instance sets is
276 (since p is varied from 5 to 230 in steps of 5 and e1 + e2 ≤ 5). Our problem
maps to the “Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem” known to be NP-hard.
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[14] proposes a greedy heuristic for the above problem and shows that their
solution is within (1− 1 ) of the optimal solution.
Algorithm 2: Picking optimal instance sets
Input: S = {s1, s2 · · · }, T = {t1, t2 · · · }, τ, c
Output: S
′
= {s′1, s
′
2 · · · }
1 U ← φ, t← 0, S′ ← φ
2 while true do
3 I ← φ
4 for each si in S do
5 if | si − U |6= 0 and t+tic ≤ τ then
6 I.append(si)
7 if | I |6= 0 then
8 k ← argmaxi∈I |si−U |ti
9 U ← U ∪ sk
10 t← t+ ti
11 S
′
.append(sk)
12 S.delete(sk)
13 else
14 break
15 Output S
′
Algorithm 2, based on [14], takes as input the set of all instances, S, the set of
corresponding execution times, T , number of cores, c and the bound on total ex-
ecution time, τ . For brevity, an instance set is denoted si and the corresponding
execution time is denoted ti. It is assumed that the instance sets have already
been computed as explained in the previous section. During each iteration, Al-
gorithm 2 selects a new instance set. The instance set, sij , selected in iteration
j is that which maximizes
|si−Uj−1|
ti
where Uj =
⋃j
k=1 sik and
∑ij
k=i1
tk < τ .
Algorithm 2 terminates when no instance set can contribute a fresh instance
to the set of instances so far accumulated in U or if adding any instance set causes
the total computation time to exceed τ . An estimate of the success probability
achievable with c cores in time, τ is
|(∑mj=1 sij )|
n where m is the total number
of iterations executed by Algorithm 2. Given an arbitrary instance whose se-
cret needs to be discovered, the output of Algorithm 2 is used as follows. Run
Algorithm 1 repeatedly with input parameters corresponding to the (p, e1, e2)
parameters of instance sets si1 , si2 , · · · sim .
In the training phase, Algorithm 2 was run with instance sets derived from
10, 000 randomly generated instances. τ was fixed to be 1 year but the number of
cores was varied. Two cases were considered - (i) e1 +e2 = 5 and (ii) e1 +e2 = 6.
The success probability for each case with varying number of cores was estimated
and plotted (Figure 4.2). The success probability with 3000 cores is 13% and
increases to over 15% with 10, 000 cores for e1 + e2 = 5. This is considerably
better compared to Strategy 2 (6.1% success probability).
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Table 3.2 showed that the computational resources required to execute Al-
gorithm 1 are substantially higher assuming 6 rather than 5 errors in the first
230 bits of us. Hence the success probability with a smaller number of cores is
higher for e1 + e2 = 5 compared to the case with e1 + e2 = 6. Beyond 50, 000
cores, the case of 6 errors has much higher success probability. With 100, 000
cores, the success probability is 23% and increases to 33% with 1000, 000 cores.
Fig. 4.2: Increase in success rate with increasing number of cores
To test the efficacy of our approach, we generated 2000 random test instances.
Based on the results obtained by applying Algorithm 2 on the training data, we
computed the average success probabilities of the test instances. The results as
a function of number of cores is shown by dashed lines in Figure 4.2. There is a
very close match between the success rates obtained in the training and testing
phases with a maximum discrepancy of around 4%.
5 Related Work
[1] attempt to learn some of the elements of u and then use CVP to solve the
reduced sub-instance. The following observation was made. If the elements of u
and A are randomly chosen, then the average value of an element in c1 would
be 6404 = 160. If the i
th entry of c1 is small and the Hamming weight of the i
th
row of T is not especially low, then u is likely to be 0 in many of the positions
corresponding to 1’s in the ith row of T. Using this idea, some of the bits in u
may be guessed and CVP used to solve the reduced instance. However, [1] states
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that this method does not seem to be particularly effective beyond number of
columns of T = 400.
[4] implemented parallel enumeration for the Bounded Distance Decoding
(BDD) problem and used it to solve Galbraith’s first challenge. They solved
Galbraith’s first challenge using Ruhr-University’s “Crypto Crunching Cluster”
(C3) within 4.5 hours. However they did not report any results related to the
solution of the second challenge.
Herold and May[2] studied the application of LP and ILP to obtain u. They
obtained results for n = 256 and m ranging from 400 to 640 for 1000 instances.
The execution of a particular instance using ILP was aborted if it failed to obtain
a solution within 10 seconds. The success probability dropped from 100% at m
= 490 to 1% at m = 590. Under certain mild assumptions, they also proved that
the solution with LP relaxation for m ≤ 2n is unique. For any given instance they
computed a score which quantifies the search space for the ILP . 219 instances of
GB-LWE were generated for m = 640. From this ensemble, 271 weak instances
were identified. 16 of these were solved within half an hour each. Since ILP is
NP-hard and has, in general, exponential running time they did not provide any
time bound for solving an instance.
Herold and May’s work was extended by [5] They presented an approach to
classify an instance as easy, moderate or hard. Out of 100 easy instances from
1000 randomly generated instances they solved 5 instances in a day using 150
cores and 18 instances in 50 days using 3000 cores. They concluded that the
increase in success rate could be achieved by exponential growth in the number
of core-days.
6 Conclusion
We addressed Galbraith’s second challenge - recovery of the ephemeral key, u
given a 256 × 640 matrix T and ciphertext c1 = Tu. Our approach involved
repeatedly guessing the first 230 bits of u by modifying an initial guess based
on the output produced by applying LP. Our first strategy was to create and
solve the resulting sub-instance using CVP. The second strategy involved 2-
step guessing of the 230 bits before and after the second application of LP. This
enhancement resulted in a larger number of instances with fewer number of errors
in the initial guess thereby increasing success probability. Also, while there were a
larger number of LR operations with Strategy 2, the reduced number of Babai NP
computations was greatly reduced resulting in much lower overall computation
time. With Strategy 1, we achieved a success rate of 9.4% using about 50, 000
cores in 1 year while the success probability with Strategy 2 increased to 11.8%
using only 27, 000 cores in 1 year.
Strategy 3 makes repeated invocations to Algorithm 1 with different input
parameters. The problem of learning the optimal input parameters is mapped to
a variant of the Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem. The parameters learned
in the training phase surprisingly exhibited substantial diversity. Also, there was
considerable variance in the execution times of the multiple runs of Algorithm 1
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with the input parameters learned. This enhancement greatly increased the suc-
cess probability to 16% with approximately 27, 000 cores in 1 year. With 100, 000
cores the success probability touched 23%. One further avenue of investigation is
the application of LP three or more times and the use of ILP or another method
to solve the resulting sub-instance.
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